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WHO ARE THE REAL CYBERBULLIES: HACKERS 
OR THE FTC? THE FAIRNESS OF THE FTC’S 
AUTHORITY IN THE DATA SECURITY CONTEXT 
Jaclyn K. Haughom+ 
From 2013 to 2014, mass data breaches compromised the payment card 
information of 248 million Americans. 1   Society’s ever-increasing use of 
technology in its everyday practices, from paying bills to corresponding with co-
workers, intensifies the threat of mass data breaches.2  A data breach occurs 
when personally identifiable information (PII) is lost, stolen, or accessed without 
authorization, resulting in a potential compromise of confidential data.3 
Data breaches expose consumer information—such as Social Security 
numbers, personal account passwords, and financial or medical information—to 
outside parties, often resulting in identity theft.4  Certain high-profile mass data 
breaches have gained substantial media attention,5 with large corporations such 
                                                        
 + Juris Doctor 2017, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.  I would like 
to thank my family and friends for their continuous support, especially my father James Haughom 
for assisting me in formulating the legal issues on which this Comment is based.  I would also like 
to thank Professor Christopher W. Savage, Partner at Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, for the 
invaluable guidance and expertise he provided throughout the progression of this Comment. 
 1. N. ERIC WEISS & RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RES. SERV., R43496, THE TARGET AND 
OTHER FINANCIAL DATA BREACHES: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2015). The Target 
breach of 2013 affected 40 million payment cards, the Adobe breach of 2013 affected 152 million 
payment cards, and the Home Depot breach of 2014 affected 56 million payment cards. Id. 
 2. See Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Prepared Statement of the Federal 
Trade Commission (Mar. 26, 2014), in Protecting Personal Consumer Information from Cyber 
Attacks and Data Breaches: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 113th 
Cong. 16–21 (2014) (“[H]ackers and others seek to exploit vulnerabilities, obtain unauthorized 
access to consumers’ sensitive information, and potentially misuse it in ways that can cause serious 
harm to consumers as well as businesses.”). 
 3. GINA STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43723, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S 
REGULATION OF DATA SECURITY UNDER ITS UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES 
(UDAP) AUTHORITY 1 (2014).  A data breach is defined as “a loss or theft of, or other unauthorized 
access to, sensitive personally identifiable information (PII) that could result in the potential 
compromise of the confidentiality or integrity of data.”  Id.; see also Allison Grande, FTC Steps 
Up Privacy Enforcement, with No Slowdown in Sight, LAW360 (July 23, 2014, 7:36 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/559907/ftc-steps-up-privacy-enforcement-with-no-slowdown-in-
sight (reporting on the FTC’s enforcement actions against companies “over allegedly misleading 
privacy promises and lax data security”). 
 4. Ramirez, supra note 2, at 16–17.  “These threats affect more than payment card data; 
breaches reported in recent years have also compromised Social Security numbers, account 
passwords, health data, information about children, and other types of personal information.”  Id. 
at 16. 
 5. The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) was a victim to a mass data breach in 
June 2015, when the sensitive information of 21.5 million current, former, and prospective Federal 
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as Target, Home Depot, JPMorgan Chase, Sony, and Adobe falling victim to 
recent breaches.6  In the Target data breach, the personal information of millions 
of customers was compromised.7  Following the breach, Gregg Steinhafel, CEO, 
president, and Chairman of the Target board of directors, resigned, 8  when 
affected consumers filed a class action suit against the corporation.9 
Responding to the increasing frequency of major data breaches, Edith 
Ramirez, Chairwoman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has asserted that 
Congress should meet the “longstanding, bipartisan call” for enhanced federal 
data security legislation. 10   Lawmakers and government agencies alike are 
calling for legislation that not only punishes cybercriminals for data breaches, 
but also imposes liability on entities for failing to properly protect against cyber-
attacks.11 
The FTC is the U.S. government’s primary consumer protection agency and 
the country’s lead enforcer against companies subject to data breaches.12  The 
FTC began its involvement with consumer privacy protection in 1995.13  With 
the increase of data breaches, the FTC has increased the number and scope of its 
investigations into data security practices.14  No statute explicitly grants the FTC 
                                                        
government employees was jeopardized.  Cybersecurity Resource Center: Cybersecurity Incidents, 
U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/ (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2017).  Following the OPM breach, Katherine Archuleta, Director of OPM, 
resigned.  Bill Chappell, OPM Director Archuleta Resigns in Wake of Data Breaches, NPR (July 
10, 2015, 12:43 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/07/10/421783403/opm-dire 
ctor-archuleta-resigns-in-wake-of-data-breaches.  This breach is outside the scope of this Comment 
because it involved a public government entity, rather than a private company. 
 6. WEISS & MILLER, supra note 1, at 1.  The Heartland Breach of 2009 and the TJX breach 
of 2007 are examples of other financial breaches.  Other breaches of confidential, nonfinancial data 
include: The Sony Corporation (PlayStation Network) in 2011; Sony Picture Entertainment in 
2014; and TriCare Management Activity in 2011.  Id. 
 7. It should be noted that mass data breaches have also occurred internationally.  In 2014, 
South Korea experienced “the theft of 220 million records containing personal information and 
passwords,” and in 2012, Shanghai Roadway & Marketing in China had 150 million records stolen. 
Id. 
 8. Press Release, Target Corp., Statement from Target’s Board of Directors (May 5, 2014), 
http://pressroom.target.com/news/statement-from-targets-board-of-directors. 
 9. In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1157 (D. Minn. 
2014). 
 10. Ramirez, supra note 2, at 17 (“Never has the need for [data security and breach 
notification] legislation been greater.  With reports of data breaches on the rise, and with a 
significant number of Americans suffering from identity theft, Congress must act.”). 
 11. See generally STEVENS, supra note 3. 
 12. Id. at 1 (“The protection of consumers from anticompetitive, deceptive, or unfair business 
practices is at the core of the FTC’s mission.  As part of that mission, the FTC has been at the 
forefront of the federal government’s efforts to protect sensitive consumer information from data 
breaches, and to regulate cybersecurity.”  (footnote omitted)). 
 13. Id. at 3.  Initially, the FTC encouraged self-regulation in the industry for protecting 
consumer privacy.  “After assessing its effectiveness, however, the FTC reported to Congress that 
self-regulation was not working.”  Id. 
 14. Id. at 1. 
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the authority to combat data breaches, but the FTC has done so through a broad 
interpretation of Section 5 of its enabling statute, the Federal Trade Commission 
Act (FTCA).15 
Since 2002, the FTC has relied on Section 5 to settle fifty data breach cases 
with private companies for “failure to adequately safeguard customers’ sensitive 
personal information.”16  In these settlements, the FTC issues a consent decree 
in which the affected company agrees to take measures to deter problematic data 
security practices, often without admitting that it violated the law.17  However, 
as the FTC continues to take action against businesses whose unfair data security 
practices have led to data breaches, private companies are questioning the 
agency’s authority to do so.18  As a result of challenges to its authority, the FTC 
is pushing for federal legislation to “strengthen its existing authority governing 
data security standards on companies.”19  The passage of federal data security 
legislation, such as the Data Breach Notification and Punishing Cyber Criminals 
Act of 2015,20 would grant the FTC explicit authority to enforce against data 
breaches. 
                                                        
As the number of data breaches continues to soar, so too do the number of FTC 
investigations into lax data security. 
Data breaches have become almost ubiquitous in every sector of the economy.  
Businesses, financial and insurance services, retailers and merchants, educational 
institutions, government and military agencies, healthcare entities, and non-profit 
organizations have suffered cyber intrusions into their computer networks. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 15. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)(1) (2012); STEVENS, supra note 3, at 4. 
 16. STEVENS, supra note 3, at 6. 
 17. See, e.g., Dave & Buster’s, Inc., 149 F.T.C. 1449 (2010) (consent order); see also DSW, 
Inc., 141 F.T.C. 2 (2006) (consent order).  In its investigations, the FTC found that many of the 
businesses engaged in unfair data security practices, which resulted in the subsequent data breaches 
that harmed consumers.  Upon such a finding, the business that is the subject of the investigation 
may elect to either enter a settlement agreement with the FTC or dispute the charges.  STEVENS, 
supra note 3, at 6. A settlement agreement with the FTC typically requires the business to 
implement adequate data security measures to prevent further breaches.  The consent order is then 
placed on record for public comment.  Id.  However, if the business “contests the charges, an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issues an ‘initial decision’ recommending either entry of an order 
to cease and desist or dismissal of the complaint.” Id. Then, either party may appeal the decision to 
the full FTC.  Additionally, the business may file for review of the full FTC decision to any 
appellate court, and, if the court affirms the FTC’s order, it enters an order of enforcement. Id. “The 
losing party may [then] seek Supreme Court review.” Id. 
 18. See, e.g., LabMD, Inc., 2014-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P78,784, 2014 FTC LEXIS 2 (F.T.C. 
Jan. 16, 2014); see also FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 244–46 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(rejecting a hotel company’s argument that deficient cybersecurity falls outside of the FTC’s scope 
to prohibit unfair practices). 
 19. Ramirez, supra note 2, at 20.  The FTC also supports federal legislation that would 
“require companies, in appropriate circumstances, to provide notification to consumers when there 
is a security breach.”  Id. 
 20. Data Breach Notification and Punishing Cyber Criminals Act of 2015, S. 1027, 114th 
Cong. (2015).  Senator Mark Steven Kirk (R-Ill.) introduced the Act to the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation on April 21, 2015.  Id. 
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Part I of this Comment examines the FTC’s exercise of authority with regard 
to data breaches under Section 5 of the FTCA, noting that, over the course of 
many actions, the FTC’s authority on such matters was not contested, resulting 
in settlements between the parties.  Part II discusses how certain companies have 
challenged the FTC’s authority to take enforcement actions against data 
breaches, and how recent court rulings may affect the results of a potential 
Target breach investigation.  Part III discusses how recently introduced federal 
legislation may deter data breaches by clearly establishing the FTC’s authority 
while also proposing an extension of this legislation to ensure that liability is 
imposed against all entities that are subject to data breaches. 
I.  THE FTC’S AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE AGAINST DATA BREACHES 
A.  Applying Section 5 to Data Security Practices 
The FTC has grounded its authority to take enforcement action against 
companies subject to data breaches primarily in Section 5 of the FTCA. 21  
Section 5 prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce.”22  Under a broad interpretation of Section 5, the FTC has considered 
the failure to protect private consumer information to be an “unfair or deceptive 
act.”23  On this theory, a private company violates Section 5 when its improper 
data security practices make it likely for a third party to invade the company’s 
computer systems.24 
The FTC uses a reasonableness standard when looking at the adequacy of a 
company’s data security system,25 exemplified by the current statutes and rules 
enforced to protect consumer data. 26   When evaluating a company’s data 
                                                        
 21. Ramirez, supra note 2, at 17 (“[T]he [FTC] enforces the proscription against unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in Section 5 of the FTC Act.” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012))). 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)–(2). 
 23. STEVENS, supra note 3, at 3.  As an example of the FTC’s authority in the data security 
context, in March 2012, the FTC released a privacy report, which set forth “best practices” for 
companies that accumulate data “that can be reasonably linked to a consumer, computer, or device.  
Entities that collect only non-sensitive data from fewer than 5,000 consumers per year and that do 
not share the data with third parties would not have to adhere to the practices.” Id. at 4. 
 24. Ramirez, supra note 2, at 17 (“A company’s failure to reasonably safeguard consumer 
data [is] an unfair practice.”). 
 25. FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMISSION STATEMENT MARKING THE FTC’S 50TH DATA 
SECURITY SETTLEMENT 1 (Jan. 31, 2014), http://ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140131gm 
rstatement.pdf [hereinafter 50TH SETTLEMENT STATEMENT] (“The touchstone of the [FTC]’s 
approach to data security is reasonableness . . . . [T]he [FTC] has made clear that it does not require 
perfect security; reasonable and appropriate security is a continuous process of assessing and 
addressing risks; there is no one-size-fits-all data security program; and the mere fact that a breach 
occurred does not mean that a company has violated the law.”) 
 26. Ramirez, supra note 2, at 17.  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB Act), 15 U.S.C. § 
6801(b) (2012), sets “data security requirements for non-bank financial institutions.”  Id.  The Fair 
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e, 1681w (2012), requires consumer reporting 
agencies to protect against impermissible disclosure of sensitive consumer information.  The 
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security practices, the “measures [taken] must be reasonable and appropriate in 
light of the sensitivity and volume of consumer information it holds, the size and 
complexity of its business, and the cost of available tools to improve security 
and reduce vulnerabilities.”27  The tenets of a reasonable data security program 
under this standard are that a company should: 
[1] know what consumer information they have and what employees 
or third parties have access to it[;] . . . [2] limit the information they 
collect and retain based on their legitimate business needs[;] . . . [3] 
protect the information they maintain by assessing risks and 
implementing protections in certain key areas—physical security, 
electronic security, employee training, and oversight of service 
providers[;] . . . [4] properly dispose of information that they no longer 
need[;] . . . [5] have a plan in place to respond to security incidents, 
should they occur.28 
Although “unfair” and “deceptive” acts are covered in the same statutory 
section, they are different concepts.  Acts of deception occur “only when 
business conduct causes tangible harm to consumers who acted reasonably and 
were misled.”29  Unfairness, however, “incorporat[es] not only the harms to 
aggrieved consumers but also any benefits to consumers or to competition more 
generally.”30 
To determine whether a company’s failure to protect against a data breach has 
violated Section 5 of the FTCA, the FTC looks to whether the conduct meets the 
requirements of the unfairness test.31  Under that test, an individual or entity has 
taken an unfair act in or affecting commerce if the conduct “[1] causes or is 
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers[, 2] which is not reasonably 
                                                        
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012), protects 
against collection of children’s information online.  “Reasonableness is the foundation of the data 
security provisions of each of these laws.”  Id. 
 27. 50TH SETTLEMENT STATEMENT, supra note 25, at 1. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Alden F. Abbott, The Federal Trade Commission’s Role in Online Security: Data 
Protector or Dictator?, LEGAL MEMORANDUM (Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.), Sept. 10, 
2014, at 3, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/LM137.pdf (“The FTC defines 
‘deception’ as involving a ‘representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the 
consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.’”). 
 30. Id. at 4 (quoting Joshua D. Wright, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Economics 
of Digital Consumer Protection: One Commissioner’s View, Remarks to TechFreedom and the 
International Center for Law and Economics (July 31, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/ 
files/documents/public_statements/573061/010731techfreedom.pdf). The unfairness prong 
“necessarily calls for cost-benefit analysis, since it weighs potential efficiencies against consumer 
harm, which makes it a more stringent test than deception.”  Id. at 3–4 (footnote omitted). 
 31. STEVENS, supra note 3, at 4, 6–7 (“According to recent testimony by FTC Chairwoman 
Edith Ramirez, using the deceptive prong of its statute, the FTC has settled more than [thirty] 
matters challenging companies’ express and implied claims about the security they provide for 
consumers’ personal data . . . .”). 
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avoidable by consumers themselves[,] and [3] not outweighed by countervailing 
benefits to consumers or to competition.”32 
B.  The FTC’s Rulemaking Authority 
Although the FTCA does not enumerate specific unfair acts that the FTC’s 
broad Section 5 authority applies, it does empower the FTC to remedy unfair 
practices in specific industries through rulemaking.33  The FTC has rulemaking 
authority under statutes such as: the Do-Not-Call Implementation Act of 2003,34  
the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA),35 the Fair and Accurate 
Credit Transactions Act of 2003,36 and the Controlling the Assault of Non-
Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003.37  Under COPPA, the FTC 
can directly regulate data security practices that involve obtaining personal 
information from children.38  By establishing rules that website operators must 
follow to protect children from crimes such as identity theft,39 the FTC bans 
specific acts that constitute “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce” within the meaning of Section 5. 40   However, the COPPA 
rulemaking statute only allows the FTC to promulgate rules regarding data 
security practices in the specific context of children’s use of the Internet.41  
Therefore, unless the FTC obtains rulemaking authority for data security 
generally,42 it will not be able to set applicable requirements governing the data 
security measures taken by private companies.43 
                                                        
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012); see also, Ramirez, supra note 2, at 17. 
 33. STEVENS, supra note 3, at 4.  See 15 U.S.C. § 57a (a)(2) (2012) (“The [FTC] shall have 
no authority under this Act, other than its authority under this section, to prescribe any rule with 
respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce . . . .”); see also A Brief 
Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N (July 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority 
[hereinafter Brief Overview of the FTC’s Authority].  The FTC is also able to seek civil penalties 
for violations of administrative orders.  Ramirez, supra note 2, at 20 n.35 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45(l)). 
 34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6151–6152 (2012). 
 35. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b) (2012). 
 36. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(e) (2012). 
 37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7713 (2012). 
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1). 
 39. Ramirez, supra note 2, at 2. 
 40. Brief Overview of the FTC’s Authority, supra note 33 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)). 
 41. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b). 
 42. See Ramirez, supra note 2, at 14–15. 
 43. For comparison, the European Union adopted generally applicable data privacy laws, 
which recognize an individual’s right to protect his or her personal data. 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the 
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. 
Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, 
and the right to have it rectified. 
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C.  The Data Breach Notification and Punishing Cyber Criminals Act of 2015 
In April 2015, Senator Mark Steven Kirk (Republican, Illinois) introduced the 
Data Breach Notification and Punishing Cyber Criminals Act of 2015 to the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.44  This Act serves “to 
require notification of information security breaches and to enhance penalties 
for cyber criminals, and for other purposes.”45  Generally, the Act requires an 
entity to notify a citizen or resident of the United States when it falls victim to a 
data breach in which the individual’s PII has been accessed, or is at risk of being 
accessed, without authorization. 46   A significant aspect of Senator Kirk’s 
proposed bill is that it explicitly sets forth the FTC’s authority to take 
enforcement action against data breaches in this context.47  Although it is still in 
the legislative process, if the bill goes into effect it will provide the FTC with its 
desired authority in general data security matters, thereby preventing future suits 
that question the FTC’s power in this realm. 
D.  Settlements: The Early Data Security Cases 
The FTC has brought and settled fifty data security cases since 2002.48  In 
these cases, the FTC  first conducted an investigation of the company’s data 
security practices. 49   If the FTC did not find the company’s data security 
practices to be reasonable, it then filed an administrative action against the 
company for failure to take the appropriate measures to protect against data 
breaches,50 with the company typically agreeing to a consent decree.51  The 
consent decree typically required the company to implement certain data 
security measures and obtain audits by third party data security experts for a 
period of time determined by the FTC.52  The FTC’s successful settlements with 
                                                        
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art.8, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 2, http://www 
.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf. 
 44. Data Breach Notification and Punishing Cyber Criminals Act of 2015, S. 1027, 114th 
Cong. (2015). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. § 3(a)(1). 
 47. Id. § 4(c)(1)–(2). 
 48. STEVENS, supra note 3, at 6. 
 49. Ramirez, supra note 2, at 17. 
 50. Id. (discussing how the FTC charges businesses with “failing to provide reasonable 
protections for consumer’s personal information”). 
 51. The agreed-to consent decree terminates the FTC’s investigation. See Abbott, supra note 
29, at 4 (“[T]he FTC has filed and settled over [fifty] cases against private companies, arguing that 
they compromised consumers’ security by using deceptive or ineffective (unfair) practices in 
storing their data. . . . These cases involved complaints that would have been adjudicated 
administratively within the commission had they not been settled.”). 
 52. STEVENS, supra note 3, at 7 (“These measures are typical of the measures required of 
companies in the FTC’s consent agreements to remedy failures to provide reasonable security 
protections.”); see also Ramirez, supra note 2, at 18 (providing examples of settlement agreements 
in which companies were required to obtain independent audits). 
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businesses have prevented further harmful data security practices, required 
companies to implement stronger preventive measures to protect consumer 
information, raised awareness of data security risks, and emphasized the need 
for appropriate security measures.53 
Take, for example, United States v. ChoicePoint, Inc.,54 which was the first 
data security enforcement action taken by the FTC.  In that case, ChoicePoint, 
Inc., a publicly traded consumer data broker, experienced a data breach in 2004 
that compromised information relating to over 163,000 consumers.55  The FTC 
alleged that ChoicePoint failed to implement “reasonable procedures to screen 
prospective subscribers and turned over consumers’ sensitive personal 
information to subscribers whose applications raised obvious ‘red flags,’”56 in 
violation of Section 5 of FCTA.57  In its settlement with the FTC, ChoicePoint 
agreed to pay $10 million in civil penalties, $5 million toward consumer redress, 
and implement and maintain a data security program “reasonably designed to 
protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal information 
collected from or about consumers.”58 
Another early enforcement action by the FTC involved Dave & Buster’s, 
Inc.59  There, the entertainment corporation fell victim to a data breach, which 
exposed the credit and debit card information of approximately 130,000 
consumers to hackers, resulting in “several hundred thousand dollars in 
                                                        
 53. Ramirez, supra note 2, at 17–18. 
The [FTC]’s [fifty] settlements with businesses that it charged with failing to provide 
reasonable protections for consumers’ personal information have halted harmful data 
security practices; required companies to accord strong protections for consumer data; 
and raised awareness about the risks to data, the need for reasonable and appropriate 
security, and the types of security failures that raise concerns. 
Id. at 17. 
 54. No. 1:06-CV-0198, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98749, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2006). 
 55. STEVENS, supra note 3, at 7 (“In 2006, The FTC brought its first data security enforcement 
action against the data broker ChoicePoint after ChoicePoint disclosed a data breach involving the 
personal information of 163,000 persons.” (footnote omitted)).  Although, the enforcement action 
was filed in 2006, the breach was discovered in October 2004.  Notably, ChoicePoint waited over 
three months to notify the approximately 30,000 California consumers whose data was 
compromised, as mandated by a 2003 California law.  See FAQ on ChoicePoint, AM. CIV. LIBER. 
UNION https://www.aclu.org /other/faq-choicepoint?redirect=faq-choicepoint (last visited Feb. 16, 
2017) (“Only after letters to California consumers became public did the company . . . notify 
consumers living in other states.”). 
 56. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, ChoicePoint Settles Data Security Breach Charges; 
to Pay $10 Million in Civil Penalties, $5 Million for Consumer Redress (Jan. 26, 2006), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2006/01/choicepoint-settles-data-security-breach-
charges-pay-10-million. 
 57. The FTC brought suit against ChoicePoint for violating Section 5 of FCTA by engaging 
in “unfair or deceptive acts or practices,” through its failure to protect personal information 
collected from or about consumers.  ChoicePoint, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98749, at *1. 
 58. Id. at *32–33. 
 59. Dave & Buster’s, Inc., 149 F.T.C. 1449 (2010) (consent order). 
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fraudulent charges.”60  Dave & Buster’s was subsequently charged with failing 
“to take reasonable steps to secure this sensitive personal information on its 
computer network,” in violation of Section 5.61  As part of its settlement with 
the FTC, Dave & Buster’s agreed to initiate a data security program to 
adequately protect its consumers’ sensitive personal information.62 
The FTC’s action against DSW, Inc.63 involved a much larger breach.  There, 
hackers stole more than 1,400,000 credit and debit card numbers, more than 
96,000 checking account numbers, and driver’s license numbers of the footwear 
company’s customers.64  With the vast number of accounts compromised, some 
with fraudulent charges, many customers were forced to close their checking 
accounts.65  According to  the FTC, DSW violated Section 5 because it failed, 
“to employ reasonable and appropriate security measures to protect personal 
information and files[, which] caused or [were] likely to cause substantial 
injury.” 66   As in many other data security cases that resulted in settlement 
agreements, the FTC required DSW to “establish and implement, and thereafter 
maintain” a data security program that would protect the confidential 
information of its consumers.67 
In the FTC’s fiftieth data security settlement action,68 the FTC alleged that 
GMR Transcription Services, Inc. (GMR) “engaged in deceptive and unfair 
information security practices that exposed the personal information of 
thousands of consumers online.”69  GMR transcribes audio files for various 
entities, including hospitals, healthcare providers, and universities.70  At the time 
of this action, GMR predominantly outsourced the actual task of transcribing the 
audio files to independent service providers. 71   GMR assigned Fedtrans 
Transcription Services, Inc. (Fedtrans) to transcribe all of GMR’s medical audio 
                                                        
 60. Id. at 1452. 
 61. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Dave & Buster’s Settles FTC Charges It Failed to 
Protect Consumers’ Information (Mar. 25, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/ 
2010/03/dave-busters-settles-ftc-charges-it-failed-protect-consumers. 
 62. Dave & Buster’s, Inc., 149 F.T.C. at 1462. 
 63. DSW, Inc., 141 F.T.C. 117 (2006). 
 64. Id. at 120. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 123. 
 68. GMR Transcription Servs., Inc., 2015-1 Trade Cas. P17,070, 2014 WL 4252393 (F.T.C. 
Aug. 14, 2014); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Provider of Medical Transcript Services 
Settles FTC Charges That It Failed to Adequately Protect Consumers’ Personal Information (Jan. 
31, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases-2014/01/provider-medical-transcript-
services-settles-ftc-charges-it. 
 69. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves Final Order in Case Against GMR 
Transcription Services (Aug. 21, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/08/ 
ftc-approves-final-order-case-against-gmr-transcription-services. 
 70. GMR Transcription Servs., Inc., 2014 WL 4252393, at *1. 
 71. Id. 
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files, which included personal information such as names, dates of birth, and 
medical histories. 72   Despite GMR’s claims that its security systems were 
“highly secure” and compliant with federal regulations, GMR failed to discover 
that Fedtrans was storing its files in a file transfer application that made the files 
available in “clear readable text . . . without authentication.”73  As a result, a 
major search engine discovered the Fedtrans files, rendering them readily 
accessible to anyone using the search engine.74 
In 2014, the FTC determined that GMR’s omissions constituted an unfair or 
deceptive act in violation of Section 5 because GMR “could have corrected [its] 
security failures using readily available, low-cost security measures” and failed 
to do so.75  Under the settlement, GMR is prohibited from misrepresenting how 
it maintains and secures private consumer information and is required to initiate 
and maintain adequate data security measures.76  As entities, such as GMR and 
DSW, readily agreed to the terms of the FTC’s consent decrees, the FTC’s 
authority to take enforcement action against data breaches under Section 5 
remained largely unchallenged for quite some time. 
E.  Challenging the FTC’s Section 5 Authority 
Given that the FTC has successfully settled data security actions against fifty 
companies, there have not been many notable judicial decisions regarding these 
issues.77  However, two private companies separately challenged the FTC’s 
authority to take action in data breach cases, arguing that Section 5 does not 
grant the FTC the power “to directly regulate” unfair data security practices.78  
At least in one case, the courts sided with the agency and determined that the 
FTC, under a broad interpretation of Section 5, could take enforcement action 
against companies that do not take adequate steps to prevent data breaches.79  In 
upholding the FTC’s authority, the courts acknowledged that the FTCA does not 
define acts or practices that are unfair because Congress “designed the term 
[unfair practices] as a ‘flexible concept with evolving content,’”80 as legislators 
                                                        
 72. Id. at *1–2. 
 73. Id. at *2–3. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at *4. 
 76. Id. at *6. 
 77. See STEVENS, supra note 3, at 6–7 (“Because most of the FTC’s privacy and data security 
cases, and almost all of its COPAA and GLBA cases, were resolved with settlements or abandoned, 
there are few judicial decisions addressing the FTC’s authority to regulate the data security 
practices of companies which have suffered a data breach.”). 
 78. LabMD, Inc., 2014-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P78,784, 2014 FTC LEXIS 2 (F.T.C. Jan. 16, 
2014); FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 244–46 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 79. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 248–49 (disagreeing with Wyndham’s assertion 
that the FTC lacked statutory authority over cybersecurity issues). 
 80. Id. at 243.  The FTC has also reiterated congressional intent to broadly define unfairness.  
See LabMD, Inc., 2014 F.T.C. LEXIS 2, at *12–13 (noting that Congress intended for the FTC to 
determine what is unfair on a case-by-case basis, and that courts have been applying the 
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of the Act found it “impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair 
practices.”81 
1.  Wyndham Worldwide Corp.: No “Unfairness” Authority with Data 
Security 
In FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.,82 the hotel and resort chain fell victim 
to three cybersecurity breaches between 2008 and 2009 in which hackers 
accessed more than 619,000 payment accounts, resulting in at least $10.6 million 
in fraudulent charges. 83   The FTC brought suit against Wyndham for its 
“deficient cybersecurity” practices that, “taken together, unreasonably and 
unnecessarily exposed consumers’ personal data to unauthorized access and 
theft.”84  The unfair cybersecurity practices that constituted a Section 5 violation 
included: storing payment card information “in clear readable text,” allowing 
“the use of easily guessed passwords” to access Wyndham’s computer systems, 
failing to use security measures such as firewalls, and failing to “prevent 
unauthorized access” to the computer system.85 
Rather than settling with the FTC, Wyndham contested the allegations.86  
Specifically, Wyndham challenged the FTC’s authority under Section 5, 
claiming that Section 5 did not grant the FTC the authority to pursue a data 
security breach as an unfair act or practice. 87   In its argument, Wyndham 
analogized the FTC’s overreach of authority to that of the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.88  In that 
case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, without specific authority over tobacco 
products, the FDA could not use its general statutory authority to regulate 
tobacco products.89  The Court reached this conclusion because Congress had 
passed subsequent legislation specifically targeted to regulate tobacco 
products.90 
                                                        
“unfairness” factors even though the Act does not expressly provide the FTC’s regulating authority 
over data security matters) 
 81. H.R. Rep. No. 63-1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.) (“There is no limit to human 
inventiveness in this field.  Even if all known unfair practices were specifically defined and 
prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin over again.  If Congress were to adopt the method 
of definition, it would undertake an endless task.”). 
 82. 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 83. Id. at 241–42. 
 84. Id. at 240 (quoting the complaint filed against Wyndham Worldwide Corporation by the 
FTC). 
 85. Id. at 240–41. 
 86. Id. at 242. 
 87. Id. at 244 (arguing that the three requirements to determine unfairness are insufficient and 
that the meaning of “unfair” involves additional requirements). 
 88. 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 89. Id. at 160–61. 
 90. Id. at 160 (“To find that the FDA has the authority to regulate tobacco products, one must 
not only adopt an extremely strained understanding of ‘safety’ as it is used throughout the Act—a 
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Wyndham argued that, similar to Brown & Williamson, Congress did not 
intend to give the FTC the specific authority to regulate data security through its 
general authority to regulate “unfair acts or practices.”91  As proof of Congress’ 
intention to exclude cybersecurity from the FTC’s general authority under 
Section 5, Wyndham pointed to three subsequent legislative acts that explicitly 
granted specific authority in the cybersecurity field: the FCRA, the Gramm-
Leach-Bailey Act, and the COPPA.92  “These tailored grants of substantive 
authority to the FTC in the cybersecurity field would be inexplicable if the FTC 
already had general substantive authority over this field.”93 
In response, the FTC distinguished its conduct from the FDA’s in Brown & 
Williamson by explaining that, unlike the statute at issue there, the FTCA gives 
the agency general authority to take enforcement action against unfair acts or 
practices, and specific statutes such as FCRA and COPPA are not inconsistent 
with this notion.94  The FTC then asserted that proving a substantial harm to 
consumers from data security actions, such as Wyndham’s cybersecurity hacks 
that exposed “unsuspecting customers to substantial financial injury,” was 
consistent with the FTC’s broad authority under Section 5.95  Agreeing with the 
FTC, the Third Circuit upheld the FTC’s authority to take action against 
companies experiencing data security breaches under Section 5.96 
2.  LabMD: Section 5 Does Not Apply to Data Breaches 
In re LabMD was the first adjudicatory proceeding that challenged the FTC’s 
authority “to regulate or bring enforcement action with respect to the data 
security practices alleged” under the FTCA. 97   LabMD, Inc., is a cancer-
detection testing laboratory based in Atlanta, Georgia.  When the FTC received 
notice that LabMD’s files containing private patient information were readily 
available on a file-sharing network, it began investigating the laboratory’s data 
security practices.98 
Following its investigation, the FTC filed an administrative complaint against 
LabMD for “fail[ing] to provide reasonable and appropriate security for” the 
personal data of 10,000 consumers, which caused harm to consumers and 
                                                        
concept central to the FDCA’s regulatory scheme—but also ignore the plain implication of 
Congress’ subsequent tobacco-specific legislation.”) 
 91. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F. 3d at 247. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 25, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (No. 14-3514). 
 94. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F. 3d at 247–49. 
 95. Id. at 245. 
 96. Id. at 259. 
 97. LabMD, Inc., 2014 FTC LEXIS 2, at *7 (F.T.C. Jan. 16, 2014). 
 98. Id. at *4. 
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constituted an unfair act or practice in violation of the FTCA.99  In response, 
LabMD moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds that the FTC lacked 
statutory authority to take action against companies subject to data breaches and 
that “Section 5 does not authorize the FTC to address any data security 
practices.”100  However, this was a slightly different claim than that raised in 
Wyndham Worldwide Corp. 
In Wyndham Worldwide Corp., the contention was that the FTC’s authority to 
deal with “unfair” practices was too ambiguous to be applied to the specific 
context of data security breaches.101  LabMD, by contrast, argued that Section 5 
of the FTCA did not apply to this type of situation at all.102  The FTC denied the 
motion to dismiss, asserting that Congress purposely delegated broad authority 
to the agency to determine what exactly constitutes an unfair act or practice.103  
LabMD immediately appealed the administrative decision to the federal district 
court.  However, the district court dismissed the case for want of subject matter 
jurisdiction because the administrative procedure had not reached a final 
decision by the FTC.104  On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower 
court, holding LabMD’s decision to seek review in the federal courts as 
premature.105 
3.  The Target Breach: Will It Be Subject to FTC Enforcement? 
The Target data breach is one of the largest breaches in U.S. history.106  In 
November 2013, cybercriminals obtained consumer payment card information 
from Target’s computer systems. 107   Target’s security systems detected the 
breach, but the company failed to take any action.108  The following month, the 
Department of Justice notified Target of fraudulent activity on payment cards 
used in its stores.109  Then, Target launched a forensic investigation and made a 
public announcement of the breach. 110   In the course of the investigation, 
forensic experts discovered that not just credit card numbers, but also encrypted 
                                                        
 99. Id.; see Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Files Complaint Against LabMD for 
Failing to Protect Consumers’ Privacy (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2013/08/ftc-files-complaint-against-labmd-failing-protect-consumers. 
 100. LabMD, Inc., 2014 F.T.C. LEXIS 2, at *8. 
 101. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 252, 256 n.21. 
 102. LabMD, Inc., 2014 F.T.C. LEXIS 2, at *8. 
 103. Id. at *9–10. 
 104. LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, No. 1:14-cv-00810, 2014 WL 1908716, at *6 (N.D. Ga. May 12, 
2014) (“In the absence of final agency action, LabMD’s alleged constitutional injuries are not ripe 
for review.”). 
 105. LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 776 F.3d 1275, 1280 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 106. WEISS & MILLER, supra note 1 (“The [Target] breach was among the largest in U.S. 
history.”). 
 107. Id. at 2. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 3. 
 110. Id. 
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personal identification numbers (PIN) and PII, had been compromised, requiring 
Target to make subsequent public announcements specifying the information 
that had been stolen.  It announced that the compromised information included 
40 million credit and debit card account numbers and the PII of 70 million 
customers.111 
Allegedly, the cybercriminals gained access to the credentials of one of 
Target’s vendors and used those credentials to enter Target’s vendor billing and 
invoicing system.112  From there, the cybercriminals gained access to Target’s 
point-of-sale system (the devices used by consumers to swipe their credit or 
debit cards) and infected that system with malware.113 Target’s security system 
received warnings about the malware, but Target initially ignored those 
warnings, which allowed the malware to spread.114  The malware then sent the 
payment card information to other servers.  Target, however, also ignored 
warnings about those data transmissions. 115   Although Target has been in 
correspondence with the FTC, the details and formalities of the FTC’s 
investigation have not yet been released.  In addition to a potential FTC 
investigation, Target has also been subject to class action lawsuits from 
customers and banks.116 
II.  HOW THE FTC HAS APPLIED THE UNFAIRNESS TEST TO DATA SECURITY 
Despite the FTC’s success in bringing forth and settling fifty data security 
actions, as Wyndham Worldwide Corp. and LabMD, Inc. illustrate, the FTCA’s 
text does not expressly grant the FTC specific authority to take enforcement 
action in cybersecurity situations.117  As Wyndham and LabMD both argued, the 
FTC lacks clear statutory authority over data security and, furthermore, 
Congress’ enactment of specific data security legislation, such as COPPA, 
“implicitly repealed the FTC’s preexisting authority to enforce Section 5 of the 
FTC Act in the field of data security.”118  However, courts have determined that 
                                                        
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. (“Fazio Mechanical Services, which provided heating, ventilation, and air-
conditioning (HVAC) services for Target, has said it was used to breach Target’s payment system.  
A Fazio computer authorized to submit contract billing and project information to Target reportedly 
was compromised by intruders.”). 
 113. Id. (“Fazio was the victim of a phishing email containing malware that was used to install 
other malware in Target’s network, including its POS system that records payment card 
transactions.”). 
 114. Id. at 4. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 6 (stating that over 100 legal actions have been filed against Target following the 
breach).  See, e.g., In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 309 F.R.D. 482 (D. Minn. 
2015); see also In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1156–
57 (D. Minn. 2014); see generally TARGET BREACH SETTLEMENT, https://targetbreach 
settlement.com/mainpage/Home.aspx (last updated Feb. 9, 2017). 
 117. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012). 
 118. STEVENS, supra note 3, at 8–10. 
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Congress chose not to name the types of acts that would constitute unfairness,119 
and delegated to the FTC the power to make such determinations on a case-by-
case basis.120 
To determine whether an act or practice is unfair under the FTCA, the FTC 
looks to the three elements of the unfairness test to see if the act or practice “[1] 
causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is [2] not 
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and [3] not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition.”121  If the FTC files an 
action against Target, the company’s conduct leading up to the data breach will 
be subject to the unfairness test.  Applying the three factors of the unfairness test 
will likely weigh in favor of a determination that Target engaged in an unfair act 
or practice by failing to take action when its security system detected the breach. 
Unlike LabMD, which lacked any sort of computer security safeguards, 
Target had a security system that detected the malware stealing consumer credit 
card information and subsequently issued warnings to Target.122  Despite these 
notifications, Target took no action, thereby allowing the malware to spread into 
its computer system.123  Target’s omission appears comparable to the situation 
in Wyndham Worldwide Corp., where the company failed to take action to 
prevent any further data breaches following an initial breach, thereby allowing 
the hackers to have continued unauthorized access to the data.124 
A.  Substantial Injury to Consumers 
Under the FTCA, a “substantial injury” usually involves a monetary harm; 
“[e]motional impact and other more subjective types of harm” will not render a 
practice unfair.125  Furthermore, although the FTC “is not concerned with trivial 
                                                        
 119. See, e.g., FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The 
committee gave careful consideration to the question as to whether it would attempt to define the 
many and variable unfair practices which prevail in commerce . . . It concluded that . . . there were 
too many unfair practices to define, and after writing [twenty] of them into the law it would be quite 
possible to invent others.” (quoting S. REP. NO. 63-597, at 13 (1914))); FTC v. Sperry Hutchinson 
Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239–40 (1972). 
 120. “The takeaway is that Congress designed the term as a ‘flexible concept with evolving 
content,’ FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 353 (1941), and ‘intentionally left [its] development . 
. . to the [FTC],’ Atl. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 367 (1965).”  Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 
799 F.3d at 243 (alteration in original). 
 121. LabMD, Inc., 2014 F.T.C. LEXIS 2, at*11 (F.T.C. Jan. 16, 2014) (alteration in original) 
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(n)). 
 122. WEISS & MILLER, supra note 1, at 2.  On November 12, 2013, the hackers breached 
Target’s computer system.  “The intrusion was detected by Target’s security systems, but the 
company’s security professionals took no action . . . .”  Id. (citing the testimony of John J. Mulligan, 
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial O fficer of Target). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 242. 
 125. FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 17, 1980), https://www 
.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness [hereinafter Policy Statement].  
Examples of monetary harms include “when sellers coerce consumers into purchasing unwanted 
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or merely speculative harms,”126  it recognizes that an injury may be substantial 
based on the number of people affected or the overall significance of the risk of 
harm.127 
In LabMD, Inc., the company argued that the FTC “lack[ed] authority to apply 
the FTC Act’s prohibition of ‘unfair . . . acts or practices’ to data security 
practices,” but this contention was wholly rejected by the Commission.128  When 
considering LabMD’s conduct in light of the first factor of the unfairness test, 
causation or likely causation of substantial injury to consumers, the FTC argued 
that LabMD collected and stored “highly sensitive information on consumers’ 
identities,” while “implement[ing] unreasonable data security measures.” 129  
Furthermore, LabMD failed to utilize any “readily-available safeguards” to 
protect its computer system from hacker activity.130  A billing manager even 
installed Limewire, a peer-to-peer file-sharing program, on a company 
computer, which increased the risk of third party invasion into LabMD’s 
computer system.131 
These acts and omissions, the FTC alleged, were direct causes of the data 
breach that enabled “unauthorized persons to obtain sensitive consumer 
information,” as well as increased the threat of other potential breaches.132  The 
actual and potential data breaches caused substantial injury to consumers by 
exposing their personal information, including Social Security numbers and 
addresses, to unauthorized persons.  LabMD’s actions were also likely to cause 
substantial injury to consumers as the breach increased the risks of identity theft, 
medical identity theft, and exposure of “sensitive private medical 
information.”133 
In Wyndham Worldwide Corp., Wyndham argued that the three requirements 
of the FTC’s unfairness test were “insufficient conditions of an unfair 
practice,”134 and that, even if the test was intended to cover cybersecurity, the 
                                                        
goods or services or when consumers buy defective goods or services on credit but are unable to 
assert against the creditor claims or defenses arising from the transaction. Unwarranted health and 
safety risks may also support a finding of unfairness.” Id. (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Holland 
Furnace Co. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 302, 305 (7th Cir. 1961) (holding a seller’s dismantling of furnaces 
and then refusing to reassemble them until the consumer agreed to pay for services or replacement 
parts constituted an unfair act under the FTCA); see also, Preservation of Consumers’ Claims and 
Defenses, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506, 53,522–23 (Nov. 18, 1975) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 433). 
 126. Policy Statement, supra note 125. 
 127. Id. at  n.12 (“An injury may be sufficiently substantial, however, if it does a small harm 
to a large number of people, or if it raises a significant risk of concrete harm.”). 
 128. LabMD, Inc., 2014 F.T.C. LEXIS 2, at *39 (F.T.C. Jan. 16, 2014). 
 129. Id. at *51. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at *51–52. 
 133. Id. at *51, *53–54. 
 134. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 244 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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FTC still lacked authority over such practices.135  However, the court rejected 
these arguments and held that Wyndham’s data security failures constituted an 
unfair act or practice under the FTCA, thereby affirming the FTC’s enforcement 
powers.136  As a result of the data breaches, the payment account information of 
millions of consumers was compromised, with considerable harm caused to 
those consumers who fell victim to identify theft.137 
To defend against the FTC’s charge that its conduct caused or was likely to 
cause substantial injury to consumers, Wyndham asserted that it could not have 
treated its customers unfairly if the corporation itself was “victimized by 
criminals.” 138   Under this theory, Wyndham could not be at fault for the 
substantial injury to consumers because the breaches harmed Wyndham as well.  
Wyndham ultimately argued that its failure to prevent data breaches—an 
omission rather than an act—could not support a finding that the corporation, in 
fact, engaged in unfair conduct.  Accordingly, the harm to consumers was 
directly caused by the hackers, not by what Wyndham itself had done.139 
Even though the Third Circuit acknowledged that unfairness actions “usually 
involve actual and completed harms,” 140  the court posited that the FTCA 
“expressly contemplates the possibility that conduct can be unfair before actual 
injury occurs.”141  Still, Wyndham defended against the charges of unfairness by 
highlighting that the actions of a third party, which carried out the three 
cybersecurity attacks that resulted in the subsequent data breaches, were, in fact, 
the direct cause of the substantial injury to consumers.142  The Third Circuit, 
however, rejected Wyndham’s defense by reasoning that, although Wyndham’s 
failure to implement adequate data security measures “was not the most 
proximate cause of an injury,” this fact did not immunize the corporation from 
liability for foreseeable harms.143    Accordingly, the court found that where 
                                                        
 135. Id. at 246 (“[I]f the FTC’s unfairness authority extends to Wyndham’s conduct, then the 
FTC also has the authority to ‘regulate the locks on hotel room doors, . . . to require every store in 
the land to post an armed guard at the door.’” (quoting Appellant’s Opening Brief at 23, FTC v. 
Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-3514))). 
 136. Id. at 259. 
 137. Id. at 242 (“[C]onsumers suffered financial injury through ‘unreimbursed fraudulent 
charges, increased costs, and lost access to funds or credit,’ and that they ‘expended time and money 
resolving fraudulent charges and mitigating subsequent harm.’” (citation omitted)). 
 138. Id. at 246. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. (quoting Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1061 (1984)). 
 141. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012)). 
 142. Id. at 245–246. 
 143. Id. at 246; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“If the 
likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards 
which makes the actor negligent, such an act[,] whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, 
or criminal[,] does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.”); see also 
Westfarm Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 66 F.3d 669, 688 (4th Cir. 
1985) (“Proximate cause can may be found where the conduct of the third party is tortious or 
898 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 66:881 
harmful actions of a third party result from a company’s own failures, that can 
be sufficient to subject the company to liability.144 
Moreover, despite the fact that these data security intrusions were foreseeable, 
Wyndham failed to restrict access to its network and did not utilize appropriate 
measures to prevent unauthorized access into its computer system, amongst 
other cybersecurity failures.145  As a result, Wyndham knew, or should have 
known, that its lack of data security precautions could result in a data breach.146  
Therefore, Wyndham’s data security failures caused, and were likely to cause, 
substantial injury to consumers, satisfying the first element of the unfairness test. 
As a result of the Target breach, the payment account numbers and other 
sensitive information of millions of consumers were stolen.147  Many of these 
consumers also incurred monetary harms when they experienced fraudulent 
activity on debit and credit cards they used at Target.148  Additionally, these 
harms not only exposed the sensitive information of a large number of people; 
they also created a significant risk of fraud to millions of consumers whose 
payment information was in Target’s computer system.149  The malware that 
spread through Target’s system was able to capture the card information and 
PIN numbers of customers, exposing them to the possibility of having their PII 
compromised.150  These factors are evidence of a substantial injury to consumers 
and resulted from the breach that occurred because of Target’s unfair data 
security practices. 
In the LabMD, Inc. case, the substantial injury that resulted from the 
laboratory’s unfair acts or practices was the exposure of sensitive personal 
information of consumers, which increased likelihood of identity theft. 151  
Similarly, in Wyndham Worldwide Corp., the substantial injury to consumers 
was the compromise of their payment account information and the subsequent 
                                                        
criminal, so long as the conduct was facilitated by the first party and reasonably foreseeable, and 
some ultimate harm was reasonably foreseeable.”). 
 144. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 246. 
 145. Id. at 256. 
 146. Id. 
 147. WEISS & MILLER, supra note 1, at 2.  The Target breach exposed the sensitive information 
of millions of consumers, but not every consumer will be affected because the hackers did not use 
every piece of data it encountered.  Furthermore, some cards were canceled before the hackers 
could use them, and other attempts to use valid cards were denied by the issuing financial 
institutions.  Id.  Although the breach did not impact every Target customer, it may still constitute 
a substantial injury because it imposed “a small harm to a large number of people” and raised “a 
significant risk of concrete harm” to those customers whose confidential information was exposed 
to the hackers.  See Policy Statement, supra note 125, at n.12. 
 148. WEISS & MILLER, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
 149. The malware captured payment card information before it became encrypted, which 
would have made it more difficult to read.  Allegedly, the “malware known as a ‘memory scraper’ 
captured information from customers’ payment cards by reading the POS system’s memory before 
it was encrypted.”  Id. 
 150. Id. at 2. 
 151. LabMD, Inc., 2014 F.T.C. LEXIS 2, at *52–54 (F.T.C. Jan. 16, 2014). 
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identity theft.152  In the Target breach, the payment information of consumers 
was exposed, not only increasing the possibility of identity theft but also causing 
many consumers to experience fraudulent card activity.153  Harms similar to 
those in Target were found to be substantial injuries in both LabMD, Inc. and 
Wyndham Worldwide Corp., so it is likely that the FTC would find that a 
substantial injury to consumers occurred from the Target breach. 
Moreover, the court in Wyndham Worldwide Corp. asserted that the 
corporation’s conduct caused substantial injury to consumers because the data 
security intrusions were foreseeable.154  Wyndham should have been aware that 
potential data breaches could occur due to inadequate security, especially after 
experiencing two breaches.155  Similarly, despite the fact that Target received 
notice of a breach, it initially took no action to prevent further intrusions.156    
Thus, like the foreseeability of the data breaches in Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 
Target should have foreseen the subsequent and more extensive breach because 
it was aware of the initial intrusion.157 
B.  Reasonable Avoidability by Consumers 
The second element of the unfairness test is that the substantial injury to 
consumers caused by the unfair act or practice was “not reasonably avoidable 
by consumers themselves.”158  Under this notion, the FTC relies on “the ability 
of individual consumers to make their own private purchasing decisions without 
regulatory intervention.”159 
However, consumers whose personal information was stored on LabMD’s 
computer system had no prior knowledge of the corporation’s data security 
issues.160  As a result, there was little they could have done to avoid the harm 
that ensued from the breach. 161   If consumers were unaware of LabMD’s 
security failures—and probably unaware of LabMD’s existence—it is not 
reasonable to expect them to be able to avoid the substantial harm caused by 
                                                        
 152. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 242 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 153. WEISS & MILLER, supra note 1, at 2. 
 154. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 246. 
 155. Id. at 256. 
 156. WEISS & MILLER, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
 157. Id. 
 158. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012). 
 159. Policy Statement, supra note 125. 
Normally we expect the marketplace to be self-correcting . . . . We anticipate that 
consumers will survey the available alternatives, choose those that are most desirable, 
and avoid those that are inadequate or unsatisfactory.  However, it has long been 
recognized that certain types of sales techniques may prevent consumers from effectively 
making their own decisions, and that corrective action may then become necessary.  Most 
of the [FTC]’s unfairness matters are brought under these circumstances. 
Id. 
 160. LabMD, Inc., 2014 F.T.C. LEXIS 2, at *54–55 (F.T.C. Jan. 16, 2014). 
 161. See id. 
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such failures.  Therefore, the substantial injury to consumers in the case of 
LabMD satisfies the second element of the unfairness test because such harm 
was not reasonably avoidable by consumers. 
Likewise, in the case of Wyndham Worldwide Corp., consumers could not 
have reasonably avoided the substantial harm caused by the data breaches when 
Wyndham, itself, was unaware of the attacks.162  Wyndham was unaware of the 
attacks for two months following the second breach until consumers complained 
about fraudulent charges on their accounts. 163   Additionally, Wyndham 
remained unaware of the third attack until cardholders complained to a credit 
card company. 164   If Wyndham had no knowledge of the breaches until 
consumers had already been harmed, it is likely that consumers were unaware 
of any of Wyndham’s data security failures.  Due to this lack of insight, 
consumers could not have reasonably avoided the substantial harm from the 
breaches. 
Similarly, the injuries suffered by consumers following the Target breach 
were not reasonably avoidable.  Nothing in the normal act of swiping a credit or 
debit card would indicate to customers that their information was being captured, 
and Target did not notify the public of the breach until a month after it 
occurred.165  Millions of consumers shop at Target, frequently using their debit 
or credit cards to make purchases.166  Consumers could not have avoided their 
injuries, as they had no way of expecting their payment information to be 
exposed.167  Furthermore, Target had not previously been subject to a mass 
breach, so consumers had no reason to expect it to occur.168  As a result, the 
harm caused by the breach was not reasonably avoidable by the consumer.169 
C.  Countervailing Benefits 
Third, to constitute an unfair act or practice, there must not be any 
“countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition” that outweigh the 
injury suffered.170  A substantial injury can be, in some cases, “outweighed by 
                                                        
 162. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 242, 246 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 163. Id. at 242. 
 164. Id. 
 165. WEISS & MILLER, supra note 1, at 2–3.  Target itself was unaware of the breach until it 
was notified by the Department of Justice, and did not make a public announcement until after 
meeting with the Department of Justice and the U.S. Secret Service.  Id. at 3. 
 166. Id. at 2. 
 167. Id. (noting that consumer information was compromised before Target even had the 
opportunity to encrypt their data). 
 168. Id.  Notably, this is distinguished from Wyndham’s three breaches.  Unlike Wyndham, 
Target received warnings when the malware that led to the harm breached its computer system.    
Cf. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 255–56. 
 169. Target did not make a public announcement until December 19, 2013—an entire month 
after the breach.  Therefore, consumers could not have known that their information would be 
compromised if they shopped at Target.  See WEISS & MILLER, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
 170. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012). 
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any offsetting consumer or competitive benefits that the sales practice also 
produces.” 171   The FTC will not conclude that a practice unfairly injures 
consumers “unless it is injurious in its net effects.”172  Furthermore, the FTC will 
also take into account the costs of remedying the injury.173 
In LabMD, the breach not only injured consumers, but LabMD suffered harm 
as well when the hackers accessed the computer system without LabMD’s 
consent.174  Because the infringement on sensitive computer files both exposed 
consumers to an increased risk of theft and invaded LabMD’s infrastructure,175 
any countervailing benefit must clear a substantial hurdle to outweigh the injury 
suffered.  Furthermore, because LabMD could have prevented potential data 
breaches “at a relatively low cost” by investing in an efficient cybersecurity 
system, 176  these factors show that there were scant, if any, countervailing 
benefits to the cyber invasion and, thus, weigh in favor of a finding of unfairness. 
To determine whether or not countervailing benefits outweighed the harms 
caused by the breaches in Wyndham Worldwide Corp., the Third Circuit 
performed a cost-benefit analysis of the cost to consumers in preventing such a 
breach, and the probability of the harm given that level of cybersecurity.177  
However, as the court points out, the FTC did not allege that Wyndham’s data 
security practices were weak, but rather, that Wyndham failed to use any data 
security measures at all.178  Wyndham, in turn, offered no response to this 
allegation in its reply brief.179  Moreover, Wyndham’s computer system was 
hacked a total of three times, so it should have recognized after the first, or even 
the second, breach that harm to consumers was highly likely given its lack of 
                                                        
 171. Policy Statement, supra note 125 (“Most business practices entail a mixture of economic 
and other costs and benefits for purchasers.  A seller’s failure to present complex technical data on 
his product may lessen a consumer’s ability to choose, for example, but may also reduce the initial 
price he must pay for the article.”). 
 172. Id.  When determining the presence of countervailing benefits, “the [FTC] may refer to 
existing public policies for help in ascertaining the existence of consumer injury and the relative 
weights that should be assigned to various costs and benefits.”  Id. 
 173. Such remedies include “not only the costs to the parties directly before the agency, but 
also the burdens on society in general in the form of increased paperwork, increased regulatory 
burdens on the flow of information, reduced incentives to innovation and capital formation, and 
similar matters.”  Id. 
 174. LabMD, Inc., 2014 F.T.C. LEXIS 2, at *50–51. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at *55. 
 177. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 255 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 178. Id. at 256 (“[T]he complaint does not allege that Wyndham used weak firewalls, IP 
address restrictions, encryption software, and passwords.  Rather, it alleges that Wyndham failed 
to use any firewall at critical network points, did not restrict specific IP addresses at all, did not use 
any encryption for certain customer files, and did not require some users to change their default or 
factory-setting passwords at all.” (citations omitted)). 
 179. Id. 
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cybersecurity measures. 180   Wyndham’s data security failures, and the 
subsequent harm caused, should have led Wyndham to implement preventive 
measures.  Wyndham’s lack of response showed that its conduct failed the cost-
benefit analysis. 
Following the Target breach, consumers faced fraudulent charges and endured 
expenses when they were forced to open new payment accounts.181  These “net 
effects” of the breach add to the injury and do not provide any offsetting benefits 
to consumers.182  Nor were there any offsetting competitive benefits to Target 
following the breach, as the corporation faced multiple class action lawsuits and 
will potentially be subject to FTC action.183  Furthermore, under a cost-benefit 
analysis like the one in Wyndham Worldwide Corp.,184  Target should have 
recognized the increasing probability of harm facing its consumers with its 
insufficient cybersecurity measures given that it received early notice of the data 
breach.185  Thus, because Target, like Wyndham, failed to take any corrective 
action, its conduct fails the cost-benefit analysis. 
The absence of countervailing benefits to consumers and competition 
following the Target breach have satisfied the requirements of a substantial 
injury under the unfairness test.186  As Target’s conduct meets all three elements 
of the unfairness test, it is likely that the FTC would succeed in an action against 
Target.  However, in absence of express authority to take enforcement action 
against data breaches, Target could potentially succeed in challenging the FTC’s 
enforcement powers in this realm. 
III.  FEDERAL LEGISLATION COULD GRANT THE FTC THE POWER IT NEEDS 
Although the FTC has successfully maintained its authority under Section 5 
to take enforcement action against data breaches, the FTC itself has emphasized 
to Congress the importance of enhanced federal data security legislation.187  
With the express power to take enforcement action against data breaches, entities 
that fall victim to breaches, such as Target, would not be able to challenge the 
FTC’s enforcement authority in matters of cybersecurity.  Accordingly, 
legislators have made efforts to address this issue. 
                                                        
 180. Id. at 255–56 (“[Wyndham] was hacked not one or two, but three, times.  At least after 
the second attack, it should have been painfully clear to Wyndham that a court could find its conduct 
failed the cost-benefit analysis.”). 
 181. See WEISS & MILLER, supra note 1, at 6. 
 182. Payment networks have issued claims against Target for reimbursement of incremental 
expenses, such as fraudulent losses and card reissuance.  Id. 
 183. See id. (reporting that Target incurred $248 million in expenses related to the data breach 
and received $90 million from insurance policies in November 2014). 
 184. See supra notes 177–80 and accompanying text. 
 185. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text. 
 186. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012) (codifying the three-factored unfairness test). 
 187. Ramirez, supra note 2, at 14 (calling for the “enactment of a strong Federal data security 
and breach notification law”). 
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The proposed Data Breach Notification and Punishing Cyber Criminals Act 
of 2015 (the Bill) would specifically require entities to “take reasonable 
measures to protect and secure data in electronic form containing personal 
information.”188  Under this proposal, an entity that fails to take such reasonable 
measures would be subject to FTC authority, and the entity’s failure “shall be 
treated as an unfair or deceptive act or practice.”189  By expressly granting data 
security enforcement powers to the FTC, 190  this Bill would eliminate any 
challenges that Target could raise surrounding the FTC’s authority to take action 
in such situations.191 
A.  Necessary Enhancements to the Data Breach Notification and Punishing 
Cyber Criminals Act of 2015 
The increasing frequency of mass data breaches implores the passing of data 
security legislation to minimize the risk of such invasions. 192   The Bill, if 
enacted, would set forth the authority the FTC needs to continue taking 
enforcement action in data breach cases.193  However, to ensure that companies 
put effective data security measures in place, Congress should send a clear and 
unequivocal message that failure to implement a data security policy, or failure 
to take corrective measures after a data breach has occurred, will result in 
increased liability for any subsequent breaches. 
This means that once an entity’s data is breached, irrespective of culpability, 
the entity should be per se liable for any subsequent breach that occurs.  
Furthermore, once the entity is held per se liable for subsequent breaches, it 
should be prohibited from contesting the FTC’s authority in the matter.  The 
presence of such language in the Bill would prevent entities from challenging 
the FTC’s ability to bring such an action in the first place. 
Moreover, such a rule would surely encourage all entities that handle 
consumer data to implement adequate data security measures, thereby 
preventing the problem of invasion of easily-accessed computer systems.  It 
would also accomplish the public policy goal of protecting consumer 
                                                        
 188. Data Breach Notification and Punishing Cyber Criminals Act of 2015, S. 1027, 114th 
Cong. § 2 (2015).  This bill not only mandates reasonable data security, it also requires covered 
entities to notify affected consumers once an information security breach has occurred.  Id. § 3. 
 189. Id. § 4(c)(1). 
 190. See id. § 4(c)(2). 
 191. See Ramirez, supra note 2, at 20 (“Legislation in both areas—data security and breach 
notification—should give the FTC the ability to seek civil penalties to help deter unlawful conduct 
. . . . To help ensure effective deterrence, [the FTC] urge[s] Congress to allow the FTC to seek civil 
penalties for all data security and breach notice violations in appropriate circumstances.”). 
 192. See id. at 16 (stating that the FTC’s policy goals “to protect consumer privacy and promote 
data security in the private sector” would be served through the passing of federal legislation). 
 193. See Protecting Personal Consumer Information from Cyber Attacks and Data Breaches: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 113th Cong. 16 (2014) (statement of 
Hon. Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n) (“The FTC remains committed to 
promoting reasonable security for consumer data . . . .”). 
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information under the FTCA.  This per-se liability rule, however, should only 
apply six months after the occurrence of the breach, thereby allowing the 
affected entity to implement adequate data security measures. 
Through amendments to the Bill, Congress should also grant the FTC the 
authority to promulgate rules and regulations for general data security 
practices. 194   Rulemaking authority, in accordance with the procedures 
established by the Administrative Procedure Act,195 would allow the FTC to 
require companies to implement specific data security measures.196  Having the 
express authority to set requirements for companies’ data security “would allow 
the FTC to ensure that as technology changes and the risks from the use of 
certain types of information evolve, companies would be required to give 
adequate protection to such data.”197 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In light of the many mass data breaches that have occurred recently, there is a 
need for enhanced federal data security legislation.  The FTC has become the 
lead enforcer in federal data breach cases under the notion that entities with data 
breaches may have engaged in an unfair act or practice under the FTCA through 
inadequate security measures.  However, as the FTC has continued using its 
Section 5 power broadly, it is receiving more questions as to whether its 
authority extends to data breaches.  Although courts have upheld the FTC’s 
Section 5 authority against such challenges, the FTC would benefit from federal 
legislation expressly providing it with data security enforcement power. 
The proposed Data Breach Notification and Punishing Cyber Criminals Act 
of 2015, if enacted, will enhance cybersecurity efforts by authorizing the FTC 
to take action against those companies, such as Target, that fail to take 
reasonable measures to protect against data breaches.  However, to further 
enhance cybersecurity practices, the Bill should be amended to specifically state 
that an entity that is subject to a data breach will be held liable to the FTC for 
any subsequent breaches that may occur, and that the FTC has rulemaking 
authority in the general data security context.  By expressly granting the FTC 
rulemaking authority for general data security practices, the Bill assists the FTC 
                                                        
 194. See Ramirez, supra note 2, at 20–21. 
 195. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
 196. See Ramirez, supra note 2, at 20–21 (“[R]ulemaking authority under the Administrative 
Procedure Act would enable the FTC in implementing the legislation to respond to changes in 
technology.”). 
 197. Id. at 21. 
For example, whereas a decade ago it would be incredibly difficult and expensive for a 
company to track an individual’s precise geolocation, the explosion of mobile devices 
has made such information readily available.  And, as the growing problem of child 
identity theft has brought to light in recent years, a child’s Social Security number alone 
can be used in combination with another person’s information, such as name or data of 
birth, in order to commit identify theft. 
Id. 
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in encouraging the implementation of readily available data protection measures, 
thereby preventing future data breaches. 
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